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On the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation 
This paper develops a rigorous partial-equilibrium analysis of the determinants of 
the marginal welfare cost (MWC)  of taxes on labor earnings. I t  shows that four 
key parameters interact to determine the magnitude of MWC.  Using aggregate 
data and plausible ranges of values for the parameters, MWC  can vary from 
under 10 percent to more than 300 percent of marginal tax revenue, suggesting 
that, given available evidence, we cannot estimate MWC  with much precision. 
The marginal welfare cost of raising tax 
revenue is now understood to be an im-
portant factor in the analysis of government 
expenditure policies, and several recent stud- 
ies have developed estimates suggesting its 
size is substantial.' In general, these studies 
have concluded that the marginal welfare 
cost is significantly larger than I found in my 
early study (1976). For example, I concluded 
that margnal welfare cost was likely to 
be between 9 and 16 percent of additional 
revenue raised, but Charles Ballard, John 
Shoven, and John Whalley (1985) suggest 
that it is in the 15 to 50 percent range, with 
Charles Stuart (1984) reporting similar re- 
sults. Developing an analysis that clarifies 
why the estimates differ so markedly is a 
major purpose of the present paper. 
Both Stuart and Ballard et al. employ 
general-equilibrium methodologies, while I 
used a simple partial-equilibrium formula-
tion based on Arnold Harberger's (1964) 
approach. It is apparently widely believed 
that t h s  difference in methodologies is re- 
sponsible for the difference in results, with 
the general-equilibrium approaches captur- 
ing some essential elements that are missing 
in the partial-equilibrium approach. I do not 
believe that t h s  is the case; almost all of the 
differences in results can be traced to differ- 
ent assumptions about key parameter values. 
*Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, 
College Station, TX 77843. I thank Charles Ballard, 
Donald Deere, Charles Stuart, and anonymous referees 
for comments on previous drafts. 
'See Charles Ballard et al. (1985), Ingemar Hansson 
and Charles Stuart (1983), Stuart (1984), and David 
Wildasin (1984). 
To support this assertion, this paper devel- 
ops the partial-equilibrium approach in a 
more careful and usable form, and shows 
that modest variations in four key parame- 
ters can account for much of the apparent 
differences in results. One of the virtues of 
the partial-equilibrium approach is that it 
clarifies the contribution these key parame- 
ters make to the final estimate, something 
that is often obscured in large-scale general- 
equilibrium model^.^ 
Section I develops the theory necessary to 
estimate the total welfare cost due to labor 
supply distortions of the tax system. It also 
corrects an error in the original Harberger 
formulation that I used, which led to an 
underestimate of total and marginal welfare 
costs in my 1976 paper. Section I1 applies 
the theory to the calculation of the marginal 
welfare cost of raising tax revenue and shows 
that by varying four parameter values over a 
relatively narrow range, the estimated mar- 
ginal welfare cost varies from under 10 per- 
cent to well over 100 percent. 
I. The Total Welfare Cost 
Here I will consider only the welfare cost 
that results from taxes on labor incomes, 
both because the theory is less controversial 
and because there is a greater consensus 
2 ~ h i sis especially true in the case of Ballard et al. 
(1985), where the model is a multisector, dynamic com- 
putational general-equilibrium model. On the other 
hand, the far simpler two-sector general-equilibrium 
model of Stuart does a better job of focusing on the 
importance of key parameter values. The model in the 
present paper is more in the spirit of Stuart's approach. 
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concerning empirical magnitudes than for 
taxes that fall on capital income. Figure 1 
illustrates the usual representation of the 
welfare cost that results from a tax on labor 
income. The worker's wage rate is w (as-
sumed to equal the marginal value product 
of hls labor services), and labor earnings are 
subject to a tax at a marginal rate of m, so 
that the net marginal wage rate confronting 
the worker is (1 -m)w. The equilibrium in 
the presence of the tax is at point A ,  where 
the quantity of labor supplied is L , . ~The 
compensated labor supply curve drawn for 
the utility level realized by the worker with 
the tax in place is S *.4 (Ignore supply curve 
3 ~ tis important to understand that the line between 
(1- rn) w and A in Figure 1 should not be interpreted 
to mean that the marginal tax rate is necessarily con- 
stant regardless of the level of earnings. The welfare 
cost depends on  the marginal tax rate at the actual 
earnings level, which is identified here as rn; the mar- 
ginal tax rate(s) that applies to inframarginal earxungs 
may differ from ths .  Thus, Figure 1should not be taken 
to imply a proportional tax, but only to emphasize that 
it is the tax rate at the margin (evaluated at the worker's 
actual equilibrium position) that produces the distortion 
in the allocation of resources. In particular, note that if 
the tax is progressive, tax revenue will not be equal to 
the rectangle wCA(1- rn)w; it will be smaller than this 
because the marginal tax rate that applies to earnings 
below wL, is less than rn. 
4This compensated supply curve is drawn for the 
utility level realized by the worker after adjustment to 
S for the moment.) Thus, the total welfare 
cost is shown by area ACB, equal to the 
increase in earnings if the marginal tax rate 
is reduced to zero (but with the worker kept 
on the same indifference curve), CBL,L2, 
less the value of leisure given up in gener- 
ating that increment in earnings, ABL1L2.' 
It is important to recognize that area ACB 
is an exact measure of the welfare cost of the 
tax within the context of thls model; there is 
no approximation involved. The key point is 
that I am using the compensated labor supply 
curve, which is necessary when evaluating 
welfare effects of changes in labor supply. 
However, note that t h s  analysis is based 
on the assumption that the market wage 
rate remains unchanged when labor supply 
changes from L, to L,. This assumption, 
common but not essential in partial-equi- 
librium models, differs from the general-
equilibrium treatment in whch the market 
wage rate is endogenously determined. The 
appropriateness of the fixed wage rate as-
sumption will be discussed later. 
To derive a formula that can be used to 
calculate the total welfare cost, it is assumed 
that the compensated labor supply curve is 
linear between L, and L,. Then the welfare 
cost, W,equals one-half CB x AC, or, 
The compensated change in the quantity of 
the tax and whatever benefits are received from govern- 
ment expenditures. Government expenditures are held 
constant along the compensated supply curve. 
' ~ l t h o u ~ hPeter Diamond and Daniel McFadden 
(1974) have proposed a different measure of welfare 
cost, I believe this continues to be the standard mea- 
sure. Put differently, area ACB is equal to the dif- 
ference between the tax revenue actually collected and 
the revenue that could be collected with a lump sum tax 
that leaves the taxpayer on the same indifference curve 
that he attains under the actual tax. This is equivalent 
to the measure defended by J. A. Kay (1980) in his 
criticism of Diamond and McFadden; Kay describes 
the measure as the difference between tax revenue and 
the equivalent variation measure of the loss in con-
sumers' surplus from the tax. By contrast, the 
Diamond-McFadden measure uses the compensating 
variation measure of the change in consumers' surplus 
and the tax revenue that would hypothetically be col- 
lected at the compensated equilibrium. 
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labor supplied can be expressed as the in- 
verse of the slope of the compensated supply 
curve, dL/dw, times the change in the 
marginal wage rate, wm, so 
Multiplying by L2(1 -m)/L2(1 -m) yields 
Note that the term in brackets equals the 
elasticity of the compensated supply curve 
evaluated at the net of tax wage rate (point 
A in Figure 1). Expressing this compensated 
labor supply elasticity as 17, equation (3) can 
be conveniently written as6 
In contrast to equation (4), the widely 
used Harberger formula for calculating the 
welfare cost is 
It is easily shown that the Harberger formula 
correctly evaluates the welfare cost if we 
measure the compensated elasticity and the 
level of labor earnings at their undistorted 
levels, that is, at point B in the diagram. 
However, these values are not observable, 
and available estimates pertain to elasticities 
'Note that the average tax rate does not enter into 
the determination of the welfare cost according to equa- 
tion (4). However, this does not mean that the average 
tax rate plays no role; it can influence the welfare cost 
through its indirect effect on the labor supply elasticity 
and earnings. For example, for an unchanged marginal 
tax rate, a hgher  average tax rate will increase the wL 
term if leisure is normal, and since the worker ends up 
on  a different indifference curve, the compensated supply 
elasticity may also be affected. To  apply equation (4) 
correctly, we do not need to know the average tax rate, 
but we do need to know the compensated supply elastic- 
ity and earnings at the worker's actual equilibrium 
position, thereby incorporating whatever effect the aver- 
age tax may have through these terms. 
and earnings evaluated in the presence of 
distorting taxes, that is, at point A in the 
diagram. Consequently, equation (4) will 
generally be the appropriate way to estimate 
the total welfare cost of a tax on labor 
earnings. 
In my earlier paper (1976), I started with 
(Harberger's) equation (5) and from it devel- 
oped expressions to estimate the marginal 
welfare cost. This procedure led to an under- 
estimate of total and marginal welfare costs; 
my earlier estimates should be multiplied 
by (approximately) 1/(1- m) to correct for 
thls error. This is one reason why recent 
general-equilibrium studies have generally 
found larger welfare costs-an error in my 
use of, rather than a true shortcoming of, the 
partial-equilibrium a p p r ~ a c h . ~  I avoid thls 
error here by not relying on the Harberger 
formula. 
Before turning to the issue of marginal 
welfare cost, it will be helpful to consider the 
application of t h s  approach to the estima- 
tion of the total welfare cost, in part because 
this clarifies several points that are also rele- 
vant for the estimation of marginal welfare 
costs. For t h s  purpose, I propose to use 
equation (4) with aggregate rather than indi- 
vidual data. If all households confronted the 
same marginal tax rate and had the same 
labor supply elasticity, t h s  approach would 
yield the correct result. However, as can 
easily be shown, when marginal rates and/or 
elasticities differ, this common approach un- 
derstates the welfare cost, and the under- 
statement is larger the greater the dispersion 
in marginal tax rates and elasticities. Al- 
though I do not believe the actual dispersion 
is large enough to greatly affect the estimates 
(at least relative to the other factors I wish to 
emphasize here), the downward bias of thls 
approach should be kept in 
his error in the use of the Harberger formula has 
been pointed out in Christopher Findlay and Robert 
Jones (1981). 
' ~ e r r y  Hausman (1981) uses disaggregated data in hls 
work estimating welfare costs. Potentially, t h s  ap-
proach will yield more accurate estimates, but there are 
some serious problems with h s  implementation of this 
approach (see my 1985b paper), and he does not pro- 
vide estimates that permit a comparison of the dif- 
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To apply equation (4), we require esti- 
mates of aggregate labor earnings, a 
weighted-average compensated labor supply 
elasticity for workers as a group, and a 
weighted-average marginal tax rate for work- 
ers as a group. Although the greatest un-
certainty surrounds the appropriate value for 
the labor supply elasticity, there is no point 
in reviewing once again the econometric 
literature, and I will simply use values of 0.2, 
0.3, and 0.4 here. Whle values substantially 
larger than 0.4 have been used in the litera- 
ture, it seems unlikely to me that a value 
much in excess of this figure is plausible.9 
The only subtle point to recognize in 
choosing a value for aggregate labor earn-
ings is that labor supply should be valued at 
the marginal value product of labor since the 
ference when aggregate data are used. An example of 
how sensitive the results are to dispersion in marginal 
tax rates is provided by the following. Consider three 
workers with respective earnings of $10,000, $20,000, 
and $30,000, who confront marginal tax rates of 30, 37, 
and 44 percent, respectively. With a compensated labor 
supply elasticity of 0.3, using equation (4) with the 
individual data and summing yields an estimate of 
$2400 for the total welfare cost. Using aggregate 
data-$60,000 for earnings, 0.3 for the elasticity, and 
the weighted-average (weights equal to share of total 
labor income) marginal tax rate of 39.4 percent-the 
estimate is $2305, only 4 percent less than the correct 
figure. Of course, the difference will be larger if the 
differences in marginal tax rates are greater. However, 
my paper with William Johnson (1984, Table 3) found 
that the average effective marginal tax rates for the top 
four quintiles of households range only from 39 to 47 
percent when all taxes and implicit marginal tax rates of 
transfers are taken into account. Of course, there is also 
variation in marginal tax rates w i t h  quintiles, so the 
degree of understatement may be larger than these 
figures suggest. 
' ~ um e r o u s  references to the relevant literature are 
contained in my paper with Johnson, Ballard et al. 
(1985), and Stuart. It should be noted that both Stuart 
and Ballard et al. use upper bound values for the 
compensated labor supply elasticity that exceed the 0.4 
figure used in this paper. Stuart uses a value of 0.836; 
wh l e  Ballard et al. do not explicitly give the value they 
use, based on  Table 1of Ballard et al. (1982), the figure 
is apparently about 0.6. These figures seem too high to 
me, although there is some empirical evidence to sup- 
port such values. Note that with a marginal tax rate of 
43 percent, a compensated labor supply elasticity of 0.6 
implies that reducing the marginal tax rate to zero in 
a compensated fashlon would increase labor supply by 
45 percent. 
theory is based on the tax wedge between 
the marginal value product and the net wage 
received by workers. (See Figure 1 where w 
is the marginal value product.) In the ab- 
sence of indirect taxes collected from firms 
(and some other factors mentioned below), 
wage earnings received by workers would 
represent the appropriate magnitude. How- 
ever, because of the employer portion of the 
Social Security payroll tax, fringe benefits, 
and indirect output taxes (sales and excise 
taxes), reported wage and salary incomes 
must be grossed up to a broader measure of 
before-tax labor compensation. A rough 
estimate of the required figure for 1984 is 
$2400 billion.1° T h s  compares with wage 
and salary income of only $1800 billion. 
The weighted-average marginal tax rate 
should reflect the combined effect of all taxes 
and transfers in reducing the net marginal 
wage rate received by workers below the 
marginal value product of labor. Thus, the 
marginal tax rate should be measured rela- 
tive to the broad before-tax measure of labor 
income. T h s  means that statutory tax rates 
are not the appropriate values to use. To see 
ths ,  consider the Social Security payroll tax 
whlch was levied at a 14.1 percent combined 
employer-employee rate in 1984. If a worker 
increases his labor supply sufficiently to re- 
ceive an additional $100 from hls employer, 
he actually had to generate $107.05 in ad- 
ditional product since the employer portion 
of the tax ($7.05) is remitted to the govern- 
ment before the worker is paid. Thus, the 
marginal tax rate that applies to the worker's 
margnal value product is $14.10/$107.05, or 
13.2 percent rather than 14.1 percent (assum- 
ing no other indirect taxes, fringe benefits, 
and so on). 
Similarly, the effective margnal tax rate of 
personal income taxes is below the statutory 
' O ~ h eEconomic Report of the President (1985, Table 
B-21) gives total compensation of employees (which 
includes the employer contribution to Social Security 
and some fringe benefits) for 1984 as $2173 billion. To  
this can be added the approximate $147 billion in sales 
and excise taxes which, according to M. Kevin McGee 
(1985), can be taken to fall on  labor income. In ad- 
dition, I assume that $80 billion of the $155 billion in 
proprietors' income represents labor compensation. 
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marginal tax rate that applies only to taxable 
income as defined by the tax laws. The sig- 
nificance of this point is evident from a 
comparison of the results of recent studies 
by Robert Barro and Chaipat Sahasakul 
(1983) and John Seater (1984). Barro and 
Sahasakul estimate a weighted-average mar- 
ginal tax rate in 1980 for the federal individ- 
ual income tax of 30.4 percent; t h s  is simply 
an average of statutory marginal tax rates 
weighted by adjusted gross income. For the 
same year, Seater estimated a weighted-aver- 
age marginal tax rate of 22.2 percent, but he 
arrived at h s  estimate by relating actual tax 
payments to variations in adjusted gross in- 
come (rather than to taxable income). For 
purposes of evaluating the labor supply dis- 
tortions of taxes, the Seater approach comes 
closer to measuring the effective marginal 
tax rate that applies to the marginal value 
product of labor." 
In addition to measuring each tax's effec- 
tive marginal tax rate consistently with re-
spect to the same broad base, it is the com- 
bined marginal tax rate due to all factors 
that depress the marginal net wages received 
by workers that is relevant. Thus, the im- 
plicit marginal tax rates of means-tested 
transfer programs must also be included. 
One study that does measure marginal tax 
rates due to all taxes and transfers relative to 
a broad measure of income is my paper with 
William Johnson, whch provides estimates 
for each quintile of households for 1976. A 
weighted average (weights equal to each 
quintile's share of labor income, broadly 
measured) of these marginal tax rates is 
43 percent, and I will use thls as my bench- 
mark estimate for the effective marginal tax 
rate in 1984.12 
"To the extent that some exclusions and deductions 
are worth less at the margin than after-tax cash income, 
the approach used by Seater would understate the effec- 
tive marginal tax rate to some degree. 
12The Browning-Johnson estimate for 1976 is really 
a weighted-average marginal tax rate for labor and 
capital taxes together as they apply to an increment of 
labor and capital income. Insofar as the marginal tax 
rate on  labor income is lower than the marginal tax rate 
on  capital income. thls figure would overstate the rate 
on labor income. However. since 1976, labor income has 
come to be taxed more heavily. 
There are, however, greater difficulties in- 
volved in accurately estimating the effective 
marginal tax rate than are commonly recog- 
nized, and the 43 percent figure should be 
viewed as subject to a significant margin for 
error.13 For example, the Browning-Johnson 
estimate, as well as most others, treats the 
Social Security payroll tax as fully a distor- 
tion at the margin (except for those earning 
above the ceiling on taxable earnings). But if 
workers view, correctly or not, an additional 
dollar in Social Security taxes as purchasing 
deferred labor compensation in the form of 
a pension with a present value of a dollar, 
then the effective marginal tax rate of t h s  
tax would be zero.14 
In view of t h s  consideration, as well as 
others, it is appropriate to consider a range 
of values for the weighted-average effective 
marginal tax rate. Consequently, I use values 
of 38, 43, and 48 percent in the calculations. 
These estimates, together with the com-
pensated labor supply figures (0.2, 0.3, and 
0.4) and gross labor compensation ($2400 
billion), can be inserted into equation (4) to 
estimate the total welfare cost of distorted 
labor supply decisions in 1984. 
Table 1displays the results, with the total 
welfare cost as a percentage of tax revenues 
from taxes that fall on labor income shown 
in parentheses.15 What is perhaps most strik- 
13see myself and Johnson, Barro-Sahasakul, and 
Seater for discussions of some of the technical prob- 
lems. 
1 4 ~ h r e erecent studies have investigated the linkage 
between social security taxes and future benefits (Roger 
Gordon, 1983; myself, 1985a; and &chard Burkhauser 
and John Turner. 1985), but with conflicting results. It 
seems quite possible, however, that the effective margin- 
al tax rate of Social Security is somewhat less than the 
approximate 9 percentage point contribution it makes 
to the overall 43 percent rate cited above. 
" ~ o t a l  tax revenues from taxes on labor income in 
1984 are approximately $745 billion. This is the sum of 
Social Security payroll taxes ($242 billion), sales and 
excise taxes ($147 billion), state income taxes ($60 bil- 
lion), and the federal individual income tax ($296 bil- 
lion). Treating personal income taxes as falling fully on  
labor income rather than labor and capital income is 
somethng of an exaggeration, but because of the many 
special provisions favoring capital income contained in 
the income tax laws, the overstatement is probably not 
very large. 
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TABLE1-TOTAL AND AVERAGE COSTS, 1984 WELFARE 
(Billions $) 
R 
Note: Percentages of tax revenues that fall on labor 
income are shown in parentheses. 
ing is the wide range of the estimates: the 
welfare cost when q = 0.4 and m = 48 per-
cent is nearly four times as large as when 
q = 0.2 and m = 38 percent. Varying the 
marginal tax rate alone from 38 to 48 per-
cent approximately doubles the total welfare 
cost. The wide range of estimated welfare 
costs that results from use of a relatively 
narrow range of values for the two key 
parameters, q and m, shows how far we are 
from having reliable and precise estimates of 
the total welfare cost. Although my pre-
ferred parameter values are 43 percent and 
0.3, the available empirical evidence cer-
tainly does not rule out the other possibili- 
ties; indeed, evidence can be cited to support 
a higher labor supply elasticity than 0.4. 
Before turning to the extension of the 
analysis to marginal welfare costs, two rea- 
sons why t h s  framework may overstate the 
total welfare cost should be discussed. (Re- 
call, in addition, that use of aggregate data 
tends to work in the opposite direction.) 
First, thls partial-equilibrium approach as-
sumes the marginal value product of ad-
ditional hours of work is constant. With a 
fixed capital stock, however, an increase in 
labor will reduce the marginal product of 
labor. How large a bias is introduced by 
assuming a fixed wage rate depends on the 
elasticity of the marginal product curve rela- 
tive to the labor supply elasticity. With the 
demand elasticity high relative to the labor 
supply elasticity, the degree of overstatement 
is small. For example, with q = 0.3 and m = 
43 percent, assuming the marginal value 
product curve has an elasticity of two im- 
plies that the true welfare cost would be 
about 15 percent less than estimated using 
equation (4) and assuming the wage is con- 
stant. Moreover, the actual elasticity of the 
marginal value product curve is likely to be 
higher than two. For example, with a Cobb- 
Douglas technology and a labor share, a, 
equal to 0.75, the elasticity of the marginal 
product of labor curve is 1/(1- a), or 4.0. 
Thus, the partial-equilibrium assumption of 
a fixed wage is not likely to have a quantita- 
tively important effect on the estimation of 
welfare cost.16 
The second problem is potentially more 
troublesome, and relates to the assumption 
that the compensated labor supply curve is 
linear which underlies the derivation of 
equation (4). When the supply curve is not 
linear, equation (4) does not provide an ex- 
act estimate of welfare cost. If, as seems 
likely, the actual compensated supply curve 
is concave, as illustrated by S in Figure 1, 
the estimate provided by equation (4), area 
ACB, will overstate the true welfare cost. 
The available evidence provides little basis 
for determining how much of a bias the 
assumption of linearity introduces. However, 
for my purposes, it is most important to note 
that when the approach developed here is 
extended to the measurement of marginal 
welfare cost, it is not necessary to assume 
linearity. Thus, estimates of marginal welfare 
cost may be more reliable than those of total 
welfare cost. 
lhTalung into account possible changes in the market 
wage rate when labor supply varies raises one other 
potentially important issue that is ignored here. When 
labor supply rises, the wage rate falls and the rate of 
return to the fixed capital stock rises. Thus. capital 
income rises and tax revenue from capital taxes will also 
rise. This general-equilibrium effect is potentially im- 
portant for the estimation of marginal welfare costs that 
relate welfare costs to changes in revenue. Note that 
Stuart does not take this relationshp into account in h s  
model since he assumes that there are no taxes on 
capital income. It is not clear whether thia effect is 
incorporated in the Ballard et al. (1985) model or not. 
Assuming a fixed wage rate, as here. sidesteps this issue 
since capital income is then unaffected by changes in 
labor supply, but the importance of t h s  point deserves 
further investigation. 
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11. Marginal Welfare Cost 
The marginal welfare cost is the ratio of 
the change in total welfare cost to the change 
in tax revenue produced when tax rates are 
varied in some specified way. With W repre- 
senting the total welfare cost and R total tax 
revenue, it is simply dW/dR. Figure 2 il-
lustrates the numerator, dW, of the marginal 
welfare cost ratio. When the marginal tax 
rate rises from m to n1', there is a reduction 
in the quantity of labor supplied along the 
compensated supply curve to L,. The incre- 
ment in the total welfare cost produced by 
t h s  increase in the marginal tax rate is shown 
by area CDEA." Area CDEA is dW; divid- 
ing this by the increase in tax revenues 
-which is not shown in the diagram 
since it does not identify what happens 
to either the average tax rate or the actual 
(as distinct from the compensated) quan-
tity of labor-measures the marginal welfare 
cost of raising additional revenue from 
taxes falling on labor income. 
An expression to estimate the marginal 
welfare cost can be derived easily. Note that18 
(6) dW=  $(wm + wm') dL,. 
Since m' equals m + dm and dL2 equals 
[71L2/(1 -m)] dm, (6) can be rewritten as 
his assumes that the incremental government ex- 
penditure restores the individual to the same indif-
ference curve, and that the benefits from marginal 
government spending are a perfect substitute for dis- 
posable income, assumptions to be explained more fully 
later. Under these conditions, the compensated supply 
curve doesn't shift. Different assumptions regarding the 
incremental expenditures require a different interpreta- 
tion of marginal welfare cost, as explained later in t h s  
section. 
" ~ ~ u a t i o n(6) depends on the assumption that the 
compensated supply curve is linear for the change in 
labor produced by the change in the marginal tax rate 
(dm), that is, between points E and A in Figure 2. In 
developing the results that follow, I assume dnl = 0.01. 
However, d n~can be assumed to be as small as desired. 
and in the limit as dm approaches zero, it is, of course, 






The change in tax revenue depends on 
how the average tax rate changes and on the 
change in actual labor income. It can con- 
veniently be expressed as the sum of the 
additional tax revenue produced if earnings 
do not change and the revenue lost due to 
any reduction in earnings. Thus, 
where dt is the change in the average tax 
rate evaluated at the initial level of earnings, 
wL2. The first term in (8) thus gives the 
additional revenue produced if the average 
rate rises by dt and labor income remains 
unchanged. The second term in (8) gives the 
revenue lost when earnings fall by wdL. Note 
that dL in (8) need not be equal to L, - L, 
in Figure 2; L, - L, is the compensated 
change in labor supply whle dL is the actual 
change in labor supply. 
Combining (7) and (8) gives us a simple 
expression for marginal welfare cost: 
In principle, equation (9) can be used to 
evaluate marginal welfare cost for any dis- 
crete change in tax rates, but to do so requires 
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knowledge of how actual labor earnings, the 
wdL  term, will be affected. In considering 
the effect on actual earnings, I should begin 
by noting that the conceptual experiment 
underlying the notion of marginal welfare 
cost is a balanced-budget operation in which 
the government spends the increment in tax 
revenue. Thls implies that the marginal 
welfare cost of raising additional tax revenue 
does not depend solely on the change in the 
tax system, but also on how the government 
spends the funds." 
The simple theory underlying equation (9) 
does not take into account the full range of 
possible ways expenditure side effects could 
reinforce or offset the added tax distortions 
of labor supply. It can, however, take into 
account government expenditures in an im- 
portant special case. If the marginal govern- 
ment spending provides benefits that are a 
perfect substitute for the disposable incomes 
of taxpayers, then the spending has only an 
income effect that is equivalent to a lump 
sum transfer. (In other words, the marginal 
spending can be analyzed as a parallel shift 
in the after-tax budget constraint.) In thls 
case, the income effect of the spending can 
be taken into account through its effect on 
the wdL  term in equation (9). For example, 
if the marginal spending, in combination 
with the tax change, leaves taxpayers' utili- 
ties unchanged, the actual reduction in labor 
earnings, wdL ,  will equal the compensated 
change in labor earnings and can therefore 
be calculated using the assumed parameter 
values. 
Although the assumption that government 
spending is a perfect substitute for dispos- 
able income is restrictive, it may be more 
widely applicable than it first appears. Note 
that the marginal change in government 
spending does not have to take the form of 
cash transfers for the assumption to be valid. 
In particular, if the government provides a 
'"everal recent papers have investigated the issue of 
balanced-budget changes and labor supply, both from 
the point of view of a positive analysis of labor supply 
(Assar Lindbeck, 1982; James Gwartney and &chard 
Stroup. 1983; Arthur Snow and Ronald Warren, 1985) 
and in connection with the determinants of marginal 
welfare cost (Wildasin). 
service that taxpayers would otherwise have 
purchased on their own, then the spending 
would be a perfect substitute for disposable 
income. This may be largely correct in cases 
involving government provision of schooling, 
medical care, pensions, and other things 
taxpayers would purchase with their dispos- 
able incomes if the government did not 
provide them. Thus, treating government ex- 
penditures as a perfect substitute for dis- 
posable income appears reasonable and per- 
mits the simple framework employed here to 
incorporate expenditure side effects. 
Granted this assumption, there are two 
polar cases that seem likely to span the 
range of plausible outcomes. First, marginal 
government spending is taken to provide no 
benefits to taxpayers, so there is an income 
effect from the balanced-budget operation 
that acts to counter the substitution effect. I 
assume that the net effect on actual labor 
earnings is zero, so the second term in the 
denominator of equation (9) is zero. In thls 
case, the formula for margnal welfare cost 
simplifies to 
The second polar case to be considered is 
when marginal government spending pro- 
vides benefits that return taxpayers to their 
initial (i.e., before the tax and expenditure 
change) utility levels. When this is so, the 
wdL  term in equation (9) is equal to the 
change in compensated labor earnings, or 
- [ d m/(I - m)]qwL2.  Substituting this for 
wdL  in (9) and simplifying yields the follow- 
ing expression for marginal welfare cost in 
this case: 
Equations (10) and (11) can be used to 
estimate marginal welfare cost for a discrete 
change in marginal tax rates under the as- 
sumed conditions. Thls analysis indicates 
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that there are four key factors that interact 
to determine marginal welfare cost. Two of 
these. TI and m. were also relevant in the 
estimation of total welfare cost. In addition, 
there are two other factors that were irrele- 
vant for total welfare costs. The first is how 
the balanced-budget operation affects actual 
labor earnings, as reflected in the wdL term 
in equation (9) or in the choice between 
equations (10) and (11) for the two special 
cases I will examine. Second, equations (10) 
and (11) show that marginal welfare cost 
depends also on the parameter dm/dt.  This 
term measures the progressivity of the change 
in the tax structure that ~roduces  the incre- 
mental tax revenue. As the equations show, 
the more progressive the tax change (the 
larger dm /dt is), the greater marginal wel- 
fare cost will be. 
Since there are many different ways the 
tax structure could be modified to produce a 
change in revenue, dm/dt will depend on 
exactly how the tax structure is changed. 
Thus, we must consider the range of values 
that dm/dt  could plausibly take on. The 
type of change in the tax system that would 
probably yield the smallest value for dm/dt 
would be to change the rates of sales or 
excise taxes, or to change the Social Security 
payroll tax rate. Raising additional revenue 
by increasing the rates of these taxes implies 
that the marginal tax rate would rise by less 
than the average tax rate;*' a reasonable 
assumption might be that dm/dt  equals 0.8. 
2 0 ~ ni crease in the rates of sales and excise tax will 
reduce the real tax base of personal income taxes, and 
so the increment in the effective combined marginal tax 
rate will decline with income. To see ths ,  suppose a 
general sales tax is introduced at a rate of 10 percent, 
and t h s  reduces factor prices by 10 percent whle the 
price level is unchanged. For a person in a 50 percent 
income tax bracket, the 50 percent rate now applies 
only to 90 percent of hls marginal value product, so the 
effective marginal rate of the income tax is reduced to 
45 percent, and the combined rate is 55 percent. Thus. 
the sales tax increased t h s  person's effective marginal 
tax rate from 50 to 55 percent. By contrast, for a person 
initially in a 20 percent income tax bracket, the increase 
would be from 20 to 28 percent. For the Social Security 
payroll tau, the ceiling on taxable earnings implies that 
an increase in its rate would increase the overall average 
tau rate more than its weighted-average marginal tax 
rate. 
At the other extreme, use of the federal 
individual income tax will typically imply 
that dm/dt  is greater than one since this tax 
is progressive. with the marginal tax rate of 
the federal income tax nearly twice its aver- 
age rate at most income levels, it seems 
reasonable to assume marginal tax revenue 
from this source implies dm/dt = 2.0.21 
Between these two extremes, two other 
possibilities merit consideration. One is to 
consider a proportionate increase in the rates 
of all taxes simultaneouslv so that m / t  re-
mains unchanged. Since ;equals 43 pkrcent 
in my benchmark case and t equals 31 per- 
cent, t h s  sort of change implies dm/dt  = 
1.39. The other possibility is to consider 
some change where dm/dt  equals one; this 
would be appropriate if a proportional tax 
were added to the present tax structure. 
While these four values for dm/dt  do not 
exhaust the possibilities, they probably en-
compass most changes we are likely to see in 
the tax svstem. 
At th;s point, a graphical treatment of 
marginal welfare cost for the case in which 
the benefit from the expenditure returns the 
taxpayer to his (her) initial indifference curve 
may prove helpful. In Figure 3, the before-tax 
budget constraint relating income and leisure 
is YN ,  and the initial tax-drawn as a pro- 
portional tax for simplicity-produces the 
constraint Y,N.  The worker is initially at 
point E, with tax revenue equal to H Y  since 
HH  is drawn parallel to YN .  Now let us 
consider a small increase in the tax rate 
whch,  ignoring expenditure side effects, pro- 
duces the constraint Y2N ,drawn exaggerated 
for clarity. Assume that the expenditure is a 
perfect substitute for disposable income and 
the benefit from the expenditure returns the 
"In 1984, the average tax rates at one-half median 
income, the median income, twice median income, and 
five times median income were, respectively, 5.9, 11.9, 
16.0, and 26.1 percent. The corresponding marginal tax 
rates were 14.0, 22.0, 33.0, and 45.0 percent (Congres- 
sional Budget Office, 1984. Table VI-3). These are, 
however, statutory rates; the effective rates would be 
lower. It is also worth noting that Seater's estimate of a 
weighted-average marginal tax rate for the income tax 
in 1980 is 22.9 percent, nearly double its average rate of 
about 12 percent. 
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worker to h s  initial indifference curve. Then 
the effect of the expenditure can be shown as 
a parallel shf t  in Y2N to LL,  with LL 
tangent to U, at point E'. 
Since the additional tax revenue is CB 
given the new equilibrium with labor of NL,, 
the benefit from the expenditure of CB must 
be valued at CE' to return the worker to his 
initial indifference curve. Note that the re- 
quired benefit, CB, is BE' greater than the 
additional tax revenue; BE' is the ad-
ditional welfare cost. Thus, the margin-
al welfare cost, dW/dR, is BE'/CB. It 
is a compensating variation measure of the 
change in surplus, and shows how much 
greater the benefits from government spend- 
ing must be than the tax revenues collected 
if the balanced-budget operation is to keep 
the worker on his initial indifference curve. 
This particular way of defining marginal 
welfare cost produces a measure that is rele- 
vant for determining whether government 
expenditures combined with the taxes that 
finance them will leave taxpayers on balance 
better or worse off. In Figure 3, note that if 
the benefit from the expenditure of CB is 
anythng less than CE', the worker will be 
worse off than he was at E,  while if it is 
anythng greater than CE', he will be better 
off. Put more generally, the marginal benefits 
from government spending must be more 
than one plus the marginal welfare cost 
(BE'/CB) per dollar spent if taxpayers are 
to be benefited on balance.22 Other defini- 
tions of marginal welfare cost are possible. 
Stuart, for example, defines margnal welfare 
cost as the loss that results when the incre- 
mental tax revenue is returned to the worker 
as a lump sum payment. This produces a 
measure of the loss when outlays are valued 
at their budgetary cost, but it is not the 
appropriate definition to use in conducting 
a cost-benefit analysis of an expenditure 
Note that equation (9) will estimate 
BE '/CB exactly. The numerator measures 
dW  as the difference between the com-
pensated reduction in earnings using the 
market wage rate, TB, less the increment in 
the value of leisure, TE'. The denominator 
22Note that this measure of marginal welfare cost, 
based on  the compensating variation, is similar to that 
proposed by Diamond and McFadden. The only dif- 
ference is that my definition uses the utility level actu- 
ally achieved with existing taxes and expenditures, 
whereas theirs uses the before-tax utility level. Note also 
that it is not inconsistent to use an equivalent variation 
measure of total welfare cost (as in Section I) and a 
compensating variation measure of marginal welfare 
cost. When the analysis is intended to provide a mea- 
sure of marginal welfare cost useful for cost-benefit 
analysis, as explained in the text, the compensating 
variation measure is appropriate. 
23~tuar t ' smeasure and mine yield the same result in 
the special case of zero income effects. In this case, if 
the incremental tax revenue is returned as a lump sum, 
the final equilibrium in Figure 3 will be at point B since 
an indifference curve will be tangent to the budget 
constraint (incorporating the lump sum transfer) that is 
parallel to Y2N and passes through B. Stuart's measure 
is then the loss, BE' ,  divided by the incremental tax 
revenue, CB. However, if leisure is a normal good, work 
effort will be greater than !VL3 when the tax revenue is 
returned as a lump sum due to the worker's loss in real 
income. The final equilibrium will then lie to the left of 
point B on the EB portion of HH ,  and Stuart's mea- 
sure of marginal welfare cost will be smaller than 
BE ' /CB  since incremental tax revenue will be greater 
and the additional welfare cost will be smaller. For this 
case, Stuart's measure has the defect that even when the 
marginal expenditure is valued at one plus marginal 
welfare cost, the final equilibrium involves the worker 
being worse off than at point E because the income 
effect of the expenditure will lead to less work effort 
than the lump sum transfer. Thus, Stuart's measure 
does not identify how much the benefits of the expendi- 
ture must exceed additional tax revenue to exactly 
compensate the worker. 
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measures dR as the sum of the increment in estimate exceeding 159.7 percent.) If, as I 
tax revenue if earnings remain unchanged, believe to be the case, our empirical evidence 
EA (= DB, since JJ is parallel to HH), less and theory do not allow us to narrow sub-
the reduction in taxes due to the actual (and stantially the range of possible parameter 
compensated, in this case) reduction in labor values from those used here, then we cannot 
supply, C D . ~ ~  provide a very precise estimate of the mar- 
ginal welfare cost. My preferred estimates 
111. Results are based on 17 = 0.3, m = 43 percent, and 
dm /dt = 1.39, implying that marginal wel- 
To sum up, the range of values for the fare cost would lie between 31.8 and 46.9 
four key parameters that will be used here percent, depending on what assumption is 
are: made about the extent to which tax payers 
m: .38, .43, and .48; benefit from the marginal government 
1): 0.2, 0.3, and 0.4; spending. It  would be difficult, however, to 
dm/dt: 0.8, 1.0, 1.39, and 2.0; defend these parameter values as necessarily 
wL: Unchanged, and reduced by the more accurate than others used in the table. 
compensated change. The results here suggest that marginal 
Table 2 displays the results of using equa- welfare cost is significantly larger than im- 
tions (10) (Earnings Constant) and (11) plied by my 1976 paper. In part, the dif- 
(Earnings Decline) to calculate the marginal ference is due to correction of the error 
welfare cost for the 72 possible combinations discussed above in Section I. The 9 to 16 
of parameter values for an increase in the percent range of my earlier paper was based 
marginal tax rate on one percentage point on parameter values of (approximately) 7= 
(dm = 0.01). The estimates range from a low 0.2, m=.43, dm/dt=l.O and 1.39, with 
of 9.9 percent to a hgh exceeding 300 per- earnings constant. Table 2 shows the cor-
cent! (Note, however, that only one com- rected estimates for these values would be 
bination of parameter values yields an 15.3 and 21.2 percent. The remaining dif- 
ference in results, however, is due to the use 
here of a wider range of parameter values. 
What was not clear in my earlier paper, but 
24For a graphical treatment that can be used to show Table 2 brings out forcefully, is how sensi- 
marginal welfare cost when the taxpayer is not returned tive the results are to the combination of 
to his original indifference curve, in which case an parameters used. 
equivalent variation measure is used; see Figure 3 in my 
paper with Johnson. In this diagram, marginal welfare Even though this model is far simpler than 
cost is DE/A H. the general-equilibrium models of Stuart and 
7 7 
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Ballard et al. (1985), the results seem quite 
similar for comparable parameter values. The 
approach used here yields estimates that are 
moderately larger than the Stuart model, but 
corrected for two differences in assumptions 
the results differ only negligibly.25 Compari- 
son with Ballard et al. is more difficult, since 
they are not explicit concerning all the 
parameter values emphasized here and their 
model also evaluates distortions other than 
the labor supply distortion. However, their 
general conclusion that marginal welfare cost 
is likely to be in the range of 15 to 50 
percent accords well with the results in Ta- 
ble 2. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
Other things the same, general-equilibrium 
results are to be preferred to partial-equi- 
librium results. Until it is shown that the 
general-equilibrium models provide signifi- 
cantly different and more accurate estimates 
(for the same parameter values), however, 
the partial-equilibrium approach has some 
advantages. First, it is easily understood, so 
it is less likely that critical assumptions will 
be obscured. The sensitivity of the results to 
the four key parameter values is quite ap- 
parent in this treatment, for example. Sec- 
ond, it is simple for other investigators to 
perform sensitivity analysis by modifying the 
assumptions regarding parameter values if 
such changes seem appropriate. Finally, on a 
more substantive matter, the results here 
seem to imply that arriving at a more precise 
estimate of marginal welfare cost may well 
depend more on empirical investigation that 
narrows the range of possible parameter val- 
ues than on developing more rigorous mod- 
els that yield slightly better estimates for 
given parameter values. 
An important point concerning the proper 
use of estimates of marginal welfare cost is 
'5The first difference is that Stuart defines marginal 
welfare cost as the loss resulting when the expenditure 
is a lump sum transfer back to taxpayers. The second 
difference is that Stuart's general-equilibrium model 
efTeectivcly incorporates a downward-sloping marginal 
value product cume. These are not the only differences 
in the models. but they appear to account for most of 
the differences in results. 
in order. These estimates are intended to 
provide the basis for comparing the costs 
with the benefits of government expenditure 
policies that do not have as a major conse- 
quence or goal a redistribution of income. 
Marginal welfare costs are relevant in ana- 
lyzing redistributive programs, but the esti- 
mates here do not indicate how large the 
relevant effects are. For thls purpose, it is 
necessary to estimate the costs borne by the 
group that loses separately from the benefits 
received by the group that gains, along the 
lines suggested by myself and Johnson.26 In 
general, the relevant marginal welfare costs 
of redistribution are several times larger than 
the marginal welfare costs reported here. 
Basically, the reasons are that both the 
taxpayer's and recipient's decisions are dis- 
torted by a redistributive policy, and mar- 
ginal tax rates necessarily rise quite sharply 
in comparison to the amounts r ed i~ t r i bu t ed .~~  
Finally, it should be recalled that the 
estimates relate only to the labor supply 
distortions of taxes. Actual taxes distort be- 
havior on a number of other margins of 
choice, and ignoring these probably means 
that the estimates here understate the mar- 
ginal welfare cost of raising tax revenue, 
subject to the usual second-best qualifica- 
tions. Further research to incorporate these 
effects into the analysis would be worthwhle. 
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